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Quarterly Economic Commentary 
Economic 
PERSPECTIVE 
PAYING FOR WATER IN SCOTLAND: A 
DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS. 
by John W Sawkins, Department of Economics, 
Heriot-Watt University, Robert McMaster and 
David Newlands, Department of Economics, 
University of Aberdeen 
1. INTRODUCTION 
During the last decade the water industry 
throughout Great Britain has undergone its most 
radical restructuring in over half a century. In 
England and Wales privatisation of the ten regional 
water authorities in 1989 removed the industry 
from the public sector at a stroke. In Scotland the 
privatisation option was rejected, and responsibility 
for water and sewerage services was instead 
transferred from local to central government 
control through the creation of three public water 
authorities in 1996. Despite these fundamental 
differences, however, domestic customers on both 
sides of the border have faced increases in then-
charges, year on year, well above the rate of 
inflation. 
In Scotland these increases have been underpinned 
by the need for additional capital investment, tariff 
harmonisation across water authority areas and 
reductions in central government financial support 
in the form of transitional relief for sewerage 
services. The statutory body established to protect 
consumer interests - the Scottish Water and 
Sewerage Customers Council - has viewed the 
sharp rise in prices with increasing concern, taking 
the controversial step of rejecting the 1998/99 
water authority charging proposals in January 
1998. The final settlement determined by the 
Secretary of State for Scotland allowed these 
increases to stand, but arranged a redistribution of 
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the transitional relief grant of £30 million to limit 
the effect of the price rises on low-income 
households. For the 1999/2000 determination 
transitional relief was phased out completely, 
leading to rises in average domestic water bills of 
the order of 20%. Against this background our 
paper analyses the distributional impact of water 
and sewerage price rises on domestic households in 
Scotland. 
Following the introduction, section two contains a 
brief theoretical discussion and an analysis of the 
recent charging reforms in Scotland. In section 
three we employ data from the Family Resources 
Survey, a source not used previously in this 
context, to examine the relative burden of water 
and sewerage charges on households classified 
according to income, property value and 
geographical location. Section four discusses the 
policy implications of the analysis and section five 
concludes. 
2. THEORY AND REFORM 
Neoclassical economic theory highlights economic 
efficiency as one of the key evaluatory criteria for 
commercial tariff structures, with prices reflecting 
marginal costs of provision. However, for a good 
such as water, market failure (Cowan 1993) leads 
policy makers to modify the basic pricing rule. 
Below a certain consumption level, water has merit 
good characteristics for individual households 
(Herrington 1987, 1996). Not only do the 
consumers of the good benefit directly, but so does 
society, through the consequent improvement in 
public health and reduction in health care 
expenditure. As consumption increases, marginal 
social benefits diminish. For public policymakers, 
therefore, the difficulty is to establish me point at 
which the consumption of water services ceases to 
yield additional social benefits, and where a strict 
cost-reflective tariff structure should be adopted. 
The task is complicated further as this consumption 
threshold point may vary from household to 
household and at different times of the year. In the 
absence of domestic metering, policymakers are 
unable to identify this point accurately, and in 
practice therefore they invariably resort to treating 
water services in aggregate as a merit good. 
In this situation higher priority is given to social 
equity as a pricing criterion. Water is a classic 
natural monopoly industry, therefore households 
unable to purchase from an alternative supplier or 
to reduce water related expenditure by reducing 
consumption are, in effect, being taxed for the 
service. Clearly, there are external costs associated 
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with the regressive pricing of merit goods. 
Hochman and Rodgers' (1969) contention that 
richer individuals benefit from income 
redistribution to the poor and Atkinson's (1983) 
principle of transfers are instructive. They suggest 
that societies may be characterised by inequality-
aversion in such a way that, if two societies with 
the same average income exhibit different Lorenz 
curves, then the society with the shallowest curve 
(less inequality) will have a greater welfare than 
the other. This hypothesis is, however, highly 
sensitive to assumptions made regarding the 
aversion to inequality. If society demonstrates an 
aversion to equality in income distribution then 
social welfare will be enhanced by a more unequal 
distribution. However, in respect to health-care 
Culyer (1971) argues that there is a preference for 
equality of access. McMaster and Mackay (1998) 
contend that the pricing of water services in 
Scotland is sensitive to regressiveness.' Social 
welfare will decline if poorer sections of society 
are less capable of consuming water services or any 
other merit good due to shifts in consumption 
patterns induced by increased water charges. 
Consequently policymakers and industry regulators 
generally support the subsidisation of the service 
for the socially disadvantaged and low income 
households, and promote rigorous analysis of the 
distributional impact of charging reform. 
In Scotland charging reform, in the guise of annual 
above-inflation price rises for water services, was 
precipitated by the 1996 reorganisation of the 
industry. Under the terms of the Local 
Government etc (Scotland) Act 1994 responsibility 
for the supply of water and sewerage services was 
transferred from the twelve regional2 and islands 
councils to three new Public Water Authorities 
(PWAs) on 1st April 1996. Prior to reorganisation 
councils were responsible for the levying and 
collection of domestic charges via council tax 
demands. Only water charges were separately 
identified on customer bills, however, with the 
costs of sewerage being met out of general 
taxation. The new arrangement required the PWAs 
There is little evidence supporting this argument 
but McMaster and Mackay draw on the resistance 
to any form of privatisation encountered by the 
previous government in Scotland. Maloney and 
Richardson (1995) document the scale of 
opposition mat culminated in a referendum in the 
former Strathclyde Region in March 1994. On a 
71% turnout, 97% rejected the former 
government's reform proposals. 
2
 Regional Councils were, until 1st April 1996, a 
second tier of local government in Scotland. 
to draw up Charges Schemes for both services and 
to submit these for approval to the Scottish Water 
and Sewerage Customers Council (SWSCC). 
Where this was given, charges were then 
implemented. Where this was withheld, the 
Schemes were to be referred to the Secretary of 
State for Scotland for final adjudication. 
As before, domestic (unmeasured) water and 
sewerage charges were based on council tax 
property valuations and collected by local 
authorities on behalf of the PWAs. Properties were 
assigned to one of eight bands and Band D 
valuations were used as a base for the calculation 
of other charges according to an approved 
weighting scheme, as shown in Table 1. 
In common with general council tax payment 
provisions a discount on domestic (unmeasured) 
water and sewerage charges was made available on 
domestic dwellings in which there were fewer than 
two persons, 18 years of age and over, who had 
this property as their main or sole place of 
residence3. A rebate in the form of Council Tax 
Benefit was not granted for domestic (unmeasured) 
water and sewerage charges. 
The fact that sewerage charges were to be 
identified separately alongside water on council tax 
demands for the first time, led the Government to 
grant transitional sewerage relief to domestic 
consumers connected to the public sewerage 
system, as shown in Table 2. Relief was first 
granted in 1996/97 and was phased out for the year 
1999/2000. The effect of this was to reduce the 
overall increase in customer bills for the duration 
of the concession. 
However, the introduction of transitional sewerage 
relief as such did not lead to an overall reduction in 
charges. Three other developments ensured 
increases were well above the rate of inflation for 
most Scottish consumers. The first was the need 
for PWAs to undertake a large programme of 
capital investment to ensure their operations 
complied with European environmental quality 
standards. Second was the requirement for all 
authorities to harmonise their charges. Third was 
the gradual reduction in central Government 
financial support in the form of the phased 
withdrawal of transitional sewerage relief and the 
limits placed upon borrowing. 
3
 The discount was 25% for a sole occupant, and 
50% where there was no such resident. 
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Table 3 lists the percentage increases (nominal) in 
domestic water and sewerage charges for Band D 
households for the North, East and West of 
Scotland Water Authorities since reorganisation. 
The first three columns exclude, and the last three 
columns include the effect of transitional sewerage 
relief (TR). 
Clearly charge increases have comfortably 
exceeded the rate of inflation for the vast majority 
of Scottish consumers over this period. 
Nevertheless, even with these large rises it remains 
true that, in absolute terms, average charges in 
Scotland are generally below those in England and 
Wales4. 
Despite the favourable relative position of Scottish 
consumers, the status of water as a merit good 
demands an analysis of the way in which these 
charges impact on individual households. 
Differences in me way in which charges are levied 
in Scotland compared with England and Wales 
implies differences in distributional impact across 
Great Britain. It is to this issue that we now turn. 
3. DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF 
SCOTTISH WATER CHARGES 
In England and Wales several large empirical 
studies relating to the distributional impact of 
charges in the water industry have been conducted 
in recent years3. In Scotland published evidence is 
much more limited (Sawkins and Mackay 1996, 
McMaster and Mackay 1998), due primarily to the 
lack of relevant data. In this paper, therefore, we 
analyse for the first time the relative burden of 
water and sewerage charges on Scottish households 
classified according to income, property value and 
geographical location. 
Data for the analysis were derived, primarily, from 
the Family Resources Survey (FRS) 1995-96 6. 
4
 Comparisons wiui England and Wales are 
difficult to make and potentially misleading given 
the differences in charging regimes. However 
details may be found in Ofwat (1997) 1997-98 
Report on tariff structure and charges, Publ: Ofwat, 
Birmingham, Table 6,7, 8,9. 
3
 See, for example, Pearson, Rajah and Smith 
(1993), Department of the Environment and Ofwat 
(1992), Rajah and Smith (1993) and Ciminghame, 
Griffin and Laws (1996). 
6
 Supplementary information was obtained from 
the Scottish Water and Sewerage Customers 
Council, The Scottish Office and the Analytical 
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This study, conducted under the auspices of the 
Department of Social Security from April 1995 to 
March 1996 was published late in 1997. Using a 
household interview technique, the FRS sought to 
establish the main sources of income for the 26,445 
households surveyed, and the way in which this 
was spent The survey covered the whole of Great 
Britain, excluding the Scottish Islands and the 
Norm West mainland of Scotland. These 
exclusions were made due to the high fieldwork 
costs and resulted in approximately 3% of the 
Scottish population or 0.25% of the population of 
Great Britain being left out Households were 
defined as "a single person or group of people 
living at the same address who either share one 
meal a day or share the living accommodation" 
(Department of Social Security, 1997, p.6). 
Although relating to 1995/96 the FRS was chosen 
in preference to the more widely used Family 
Expenditure Survey for its relatively large Scottish 
sample size7 and its comprehensive coverage of 
household income and expenditure. 
Supplementary information from the SWSCC 
permitted the imputation of sewerage charges 
which were not separately identified. 
Tables 4 and 5 contain figures relating to the 
relative burden of water and sewerage charges for 
households classified according to income and 
property value respectively. 
Table 4 reports mean weekly household water and 
sewerage charges for Scotland in absolute terms 
and as a percentage of gross weekly household 
income. For the year 1995/96 (prior to the recent 
reorganisation and the very large price rises) 
households in the lowest income bracket (gross 
weekly household income of less than £100) spent 
over 3.2% of their gross weekly household income 
on water and sewerage charges. For households in 
the next income bracket, £100-199, the figure was 
still as high as 1.4%. In contrast, the comparable 
figure for middle income households (in the 
income brackets between £400 and £699) was in 
the range 0.4-0.6% while this declined to under 
0.3% for those in the highest income bracket (gross 
weekly household income of £1000 or more). 
Table 5 reports the mean percentage of gross 
weekly household income spent on water and 
Services Division of the Department of Social 
Security. 
7
 The FRS surveyed over 2,300 Scottish 
households compared with just 555 for the 1996-97 
FES. 
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sewerage charges for Scotland by gross weekly 
household income and council tax band. As is to 
be expected under a council tax system of property 
based charges, low income households spend a 
greater proportion of their gross weekly household 
income on water and sewerage the higher is the 
value of their house. Caution should be exercised 
when looking at the estimates for bands F, G and H 
due to the relatively small number of sample cases 
but, even ignoring these bands, Table 5 indicates 
the scale of the burden on low income households 
in the higher property bands. In band E, 
households in the lowest income bracket spend 25 
times the proportion of their gross weekly 
household income on water and sewerage as 
households in the highest income bracket. 
Households in the second and third lowest income 
brackets in band E spend 7 and 4 times as much 
respectively as the highest income households. 
Thus, the current system of charging places a 
heavy burden on those with low fixed incomes (for 
example some pensioner groups) living in highly 
valued properties. 
For the SWSCC and The Scottish Office, 
identification of areas of the country where large 
increases in water charges would have the greatest 
collective impact on low income households is an 
issue of particular concern. Without detailed 
income distribution data for each local authority 
area, however, the analysis is problematic. 
However, given t ie frequent correlation between 
house prices - on which council tax bands are 
based - and average income or other measures of 
economic prosperity, one proxy of relative social 
need is the distribution of dwellings across council 
tax bands. In Table 6, this information is reported 
for each of the Scottish local authority areas. 
Over 90% of recipients of Council Tax Benefit live 
in houses in Bands A to C8. We therefore assume 
that these are the property bands accounting for 
most low income households. This implies mat 
households in areas such as East Ayrshire, Dundee 
and Inverclyde (where nearly 80% of houses are in 
council tax bands A-C) experience more social 
need and would encounter more difficulties in 
paying increased water charges than households in 
East Dunbartonshire, Edinburgh and East Lothian 
(where only some 30%, 50% and 60% respectively 
of houses are in council tax bands A-C). However, 
clearly there is not a one to one correspondence 
between social need and property valuation and a 
more detailed analysis of income distributions 
8
 Scottish Office News Release 0328/98 23rd 
February 1998. 
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within local authority areas would be necessary to 
develop this work farther. 
4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Overall, these results are unsurprising since one of 
the fundamental stylised facts of economic analysis 
is that the burden of expenditure on food and other 
staples is proportionately greater for low income 
households. However, die analysis presented 
above stands as the first calibration exercise for 
water and sewerage charges across Scotland. 
Furthermore, given the above-inflation increases in 
charges for the majority of Scottish consumers 
since the date of the survey, there are grounds for 
concluding that the relative burden of water and 
sewerage charges on low income households has 
increased quite markedly since the reorganisation 
of the industry. 
This observation underpinned the SWSCC's case 
for the referral of the 1998/99 draft water authority 
charges schemes to the Secretary of State for 
Scotland in January 1998. In response the 
Government altered the system of allocating 
domestic transitional sewerage relief from a 
property value basis to one in which each 
household in a water authority area would receive a 
flat rate grant regardless of Council Tax Band. The 
effect of this was to give proportionately greater 
levels of relief to those in Council Tax bands A to 
C for the year 1998/99. However, with the phasing 
out of transitional relief in 1999/2000 this modest 
redistribution comes to an end. Consequently the 
issue of how to protect the interests of low income 
households whilst implementing large tariff 
increases remains one of the most pressing policy 
issues facing the Scottish water industry and its 
regulators. 
Previous studies have identified the many ways in 
which economic efficiency and social equity may 
conflict as pricing criteria9. Economic efficiency 
implies that water services should be allocated over 
time and between customers to maximise society's 
net benefits. This implies cost reflective pricing at 
the margin (Herrington 1987). However, without 
universal domestic metering this objective is 
unattainable. The absence of metering also inhibits 
the targeting of relief to socially disadvantaged 
households, leading to a charging system which has 
the potential to create and sustain multiple water 
"poverty traps". Given the present system of 
charging in Scotland there are, however, two ways 
9
 See, for example Pearson, Rajah and Smith 
(1993), Sawkins and Mackay (1996) and McMaster 
and Mackay (1998). 
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in which the effects of above inflation price rises 
for water services might be mitigated. 
The first is through the introduction of a water 
related social security benefit - a "Water Benefit". 
Despite the best efforts of the Ofwat National 
Customer Council in England and Wales, the 
Department of Social Security has consistently 
rejected arguments that water should be singled out 
for special treatment within the benefits system. At 
present there are no special "earmarked" social 
security funds dedicated to the alleviation of social 
disadvantage caused by rapidly rising water and 
sewerage charges. The council tax system of 
charging used in Scotland, although modestly 
progressive in effect, was not designed as an 
instrument of social policy. The differing charge 
application ratios proxy the use of local authority 
services by households and it is this which 
underpins the policy of granting disabled people a 
shift in council tax band by way of charge 
reduction. The most significant feature of the 
current social security arrangements pertaining to 
the Scottish water industry is that Council Tax 
Benefit does not apply to domestic (unmeasured) 
water and sewerage charges. 
Due to water's merit good and natural monopoly 
characteristics, there is a strong argument in favour 
of viewing water charging systems in conjunction 
with the taxation and social security arrangements. 
Rajah and Smith (1993) note that in practical terms 
what matters in designing an equitable tax system 
is the distribution of the burden of taxation as a 
whole, not each individual element of the system. 
They suggest that "the regressive burden of water 
charges could be compensated by greater 
progressivity in income tax and in the social 
security system, through higher income tax 
allowances and higher levels of social security 
benefits. Higher benefit levels could, for example, 
provide poor households with sufficient money to 
leave a household with average water consumption 
unaffected by the introduction of metered water 
charges at the efficient level, whilst ensuring that 
those households with wasteful water use faced the 
full marginal cost of their use of water" (Rajah and 
Smith, 1993, p.105). In similar vein, Dilnot and 
Helm (1987) have argued for supplements to social 
security payments to cover utility charges. 
Integrating taxation, social security and water 
charging arrangements may not, however, address 
the problem of water poverty adequately for two 
reasons. First, the social security system may not 
target people's needs adequately. Needs may not 
be observed correctly. Thus, it may be appropriate 
to supply water at lower prices to ensure that 
Volume 24, No3,1999 
households with higher than average needs for 
water are able to afford adequate quantities. On 
balance this would probably not be problematic in 
a developed country like Scotland. Second, there 
is also the question of providing households in high 
charge areas with larger amounts of compensation 
than those in low charge areas. Again it should not 
be too problematic to devise a charging system to 
compensate households appropriately. Housing 
Benefit is an example of an existing social security 
benefit, the level of which varies according to costs 
in different parts of the country. Practically, 
therefore, it should be possible to introduce a 
system of water charge rebates or "water benefif', 
the level of which would be related to the average 
level of water charges levied by each water 
authority in Scotland. 
The second way in which the effects of above 
inflation rises in water charges might be mitigated 
for disadvantaged households is through the 
reformulation of the council tax charging 
application ratio for water. Once again this 
solution would be administratively feasible and 
could be implemented quickly. Given a property-
based system of charging it would merely require 
the alteration of the charge application ratios for 
water, shown in Table 1, for households in the 
lower property bands. Thus, the ratio for 
households in band A properties could be reduced 
below the current 6/9tns of charges paid by 
households in band D properties, the ratio for 
households in band B properties would be reduced 
below 7/9ms and the ratio for households in band C 
properties would be reduced below 8/9ths. This is 
a less well targeted solution since it would benefit 
all property owners in these bands, but the granting 
of transitional sewerage relief at a flat rate by the 
Secretary of State for Scotland was a policy 
initiative in this mould. 
Both proposals might be debated, quite properly, 
by Members of the Scottish Parliament, to whom 
the public water authorities will become 
responsible this summer. At present only the 
second proposal is within the competence of the 
Parliament, although Members will be at liberty to 
press government agencies - specifically the DSS -
to change their policy. In the medium term the 
appointment of a new Water Industry 
Commissioner for Scotland10 may prompt a re-
examination of the position of socially 
disadvantaged groups in society with respect to 
water and sewerage services. 
10
 A proposal in the Water Industry Bill currently 
being debated in the House of Lords. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Faced with the requirement to finance a growing 
proportion of their activities from customer charges 
without discriminating against any group of 
consumers" the Scottish public water authorities 
find themselves pulled in two directions. On me 
one hand they must endeavour to operate 
efficiently as trading corporations, on the other 
they must satisfy the industry regulators that the 
public interest is being promoted and protected at 
the same time. This dynamic may be observed in 
the charging debate discussed in this paper. 
No one charging scheme is ever likely to command 
universal approval from all stakeholders in die 
industry. Consequently political judgement will 
remain an integral part of the bargaining process. 
In this paper we argue that relatively minor 
changes to the social security or council tax 
systems would enable policymakers concerned 
over the effects of rapidly rising water charges on 
low income households to partially protect the 
interests of this group of consumers. However 
these are rather blunt instruments, which would 
not, by themselves, promote the efficient allocation 
of resources in the water industry. 
Nevertheless, the means of correcting this 
deficiency, and ensuring social objectives are met 
lies within the industry's grasp. A volumetric 
charging system underpinned by universal 
domestic metering would achieve this end. 
However, until universal metering is introduced, it 
is essential that better protection be given to low 
income groups through one of the devices 
discussed in this paper or in some other way. This 
is the primary challenge facing the Scottish water 
industry in the closing years of the century. 
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TABLE 1 PROPERTY BANDS AND CHARGE APPLICATION RATIOS IN SCOTLAND 
Property band 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
Valuation band (£) 
up to 27,000 
27,001-35,000 
35,001-45,000 
45,001-58,000 
58,001-80,000 
80,001-106,000 
106,001-212,000 
more than 212,000 
Charge application ratio 
6/9ths 
7/9ths 
8/9ths 
9/9ths 
ll/9ms 
13/9ths 
15/9ths 
18/9ths 
Source: Local Government Finance Act 1992, Section 74. 
TABLE 2 TRANSITIONAL SEWERAGE RELIEF, £ MHXION 
Water Authority 
North 
East 
West 
Total 
1996/97 
22.4 
27.3 
40.0 
89.7 
1997/98 
14.9 
18.2 
26.6 
59.7 
1998/99 
7.4 
9.0 
13.2 
29.7 
Sources: 1996/97 - Table 2.13 Departments of the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Forestry Commission 
(1996) The Government's Expenditure Plans 1996/97 to 1998/99, Cm 3214, HMSO Edinburgh; 1997/98 - The 
Scottish Office; 1998/99 - Scottish Water and Sewerage Customers Council; 1998/99 total does not sum due to 
rounding. 
TABLE 3 PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN DOMESTIC (UNMEASURED) WATER AND SEWERAGE 
CHARGES FOR BAND D HOUSEHOLDS 
WATER AUTHORITY 
AREA 
NORTH 
Tayside 
Grampian 
Highland 
Western Isles 
Orkney 
Shetland 
EAST 
Borders 
Forth Valley 
Fife 
Edinburgh and 
Lothians 
North Lanarkshire and 
East Dunbartonshire 
Kinross 
WEST 
Dumfries and 
Galloway 
Strathclyde 
% Increase 
1996/97 -
1997/98, 
excl. TR 
8.42 
6.96 
6.96 
-0.28 
-0.28 
-0.28 
6.46 
10.05 
10.12 
6.46 
6.00 
8.99 
6.00 
6.00 
% Increase 
1997/98 -
1998/99, 
excl. TR 
15.21 
12.43 
12.43 
4.97 
4.97 
4.97 
9.87 
25.06 
19.04 
9.87 
11.36 
14.39 
11.36 
11.36 
% Increase 
1998/99-
1999/00 
excl. TR 
15.17 
10.53 
10.53 
10.53 
10.53 
10.53 
7.08 
19.15 
8.76 
7.08 
10.48 
8.76 
10.48 
10.48 
% Increase 
1996/97 -
1997/98, 
incl. TR 
39.58 
32.23 
32.23 
16.40 
16.40 
16.40 
28.58 
53.89 
42.36 
28.58 
28.73 
36.55 
28.73 
28.73 
% Increase 
1997/98 -
1998/99, 
incl. TR 
39.35 
32.95 
32.95 
21.57 
21.57 
21.57 
28.05 
59.33 
44.15 
28.05 
31.16 
31.84 
31.16 
31.16 
% Increase 
1998/99-
1999/00 
incl. TR 
29.32 
23.15 
23.15 
23.15 
23.15 
23.15 
18.30 
34.39 
20.97 
18.30 
21.74 
20.97 
21.74 
21.74 
Source: Data supplied by Scottish Water and Sewerage Customers Council. 
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TABLE 4 SCOTTISH WATER AND SEWERAGE CHARGES AS A MEAN PERCENTAGE OF 
GROSS WEEKLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME, BY HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
Gross weekly 
household income 
Less than £100 
£100-199 
£200-299 
£300-399 
£400-499 
£500-599 
£600-699 
£700-799 
£800-899 
£900-999 
£,1000 or more 
Mean weekly 
household 
water charge 
(£) 
1.04 
1.10 
1.25 
1.41 
1.46 
1.54 
1.68 
1.72 
1.90 
1.88 
2.11 
Mean weekly 
household 
sewerage 
charge 
(£) 
0.86 
0.87 
0.92 
0.98 
1.02 
1.06 
1.13 
1.20 
1.28 
1.28 
1.41 
Mean weekly 
household 
water and 
sewerage 
charge (£) 
1.90 
1.97 
2.17 
2.39 
2.48 
2.60 
2.81 
2.92 
3.18 
3.16 
3.52 
Mean % gross weekly 
household income spent 
on water and sewerage 
(%) 
3.21 
1.40 
0.89 
0.70 
0.56 
0.47 
0.43 
0.39 
0.38 
0.33 
0.28 
Source: Family Resources Survey 1995/96 
TABLE 5 SCOTTISH WATER AND SEWERAGE CHARGES AS A MEAN PERCENTAGE OF 
GROSS WEEKLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME, BY HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND COUNCIL TAX BAND 
Gross weekly 
household income 
Less than £100 
£100-199 
£200-299 
£300-399 
£400-499 
£500-599 
£600-699 
£700-799 
£800-899 
£900-999 
£,1000 or more 
Band A 
(%) 
1.98 
(107) 
1.18 
(269) 
0.66 
(82) 
0.49 
(44) 
0.42 
(16) 
0.33 
(11) 
0.30 
(7) 
0.25 
(6) 
0.23 
(2) 
-(0) 
0.13 
BandB 
(%) 
4.03 
(80) 
1.35 
(230) 
0.83 
(121) 
0.58 
(87) 
0.46 
(62) 
0.37 
(37) 
0.32 
(15) 
0.26 
(10) 
0.25 
(3) 
0.22 
(2) 
0.16 
(7) 
BandC 
(%) 
3.05 
(39) 
1.52 
(112) 
0.92 
(70) 
0.68 
(65) 
0.52 
(50) 
0.42 
(32) 
0.38 
(18) 
0.31 
(12) 
0.28 
(4) 
0.26 
(2) 
0.18 
(2) 
BandD 
(%) 
3.79 
(20) 
1.72 
(61) 
1.03 
(46) 
0.76 
(46) 
0.57 
(50) 
0.47 
(40) 
0.42 
(27) 
0.34 
(10) 
0.32 
(10) 
0.30 
(5) 
0.25 
(9) 
BandE 
(%) 
7.41 
(8) 
2.11 
(31) 
1.27 
(20) 
0.95 
(36) 
0.73 
(26) 
0.58 
(30) 
0.51 
(23) 
0.45 
(20) 
0.39 
(14) 
0.33 
(11) 
0.29 
(21) 
BandF 
(%) 
5.10 
(5) 
2.59 
(16) 
1.53 
(12) 
1.16 
(8) 
0.76 
(7) 
0.68 
(9) 
0.61 
(10) 
0.48 
(8) 
0.47 
(11) 
0.43 
(6) 
0.35 
(13) 
BandG 
(%) 
14.69 
(1) 
2.29 
(2) 
1.83 
(3) 
1.30 
(7) 
0.98 
(8) 
0.81 
(5) 
0.60 
(5) 
0.57 
(8) 
0.56 
(4) 
0.46 
(1) 
0.29 
(17) 
BandH 
(%) 
0.76 
(1) 
0.53 
(3) 
Source: Family Resources Survey 1995/96. 
Notes: i) a constant mean sewerage charge within council tax bands across income groups is assumed; ii) some 
of the estimates are based on a small number of sample cases and are therefore subject to relatively high 
sampling error. 
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